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The impact of education on political ideology:
Evidence from European compulsory
education reforms
Andrew G. Meyer

Department of Economics, Marquette University, 606 North 13th St., Milwaukee, WI

Abstract
Previous research documents a correlation between education and political ideology, usually indicating a
positive relationship between education and left-wing political views. In this paper, I examine to what extent this
association is causal. I merge political ideology data from 25 waves of Eurobarometer surveys with information
on 18 educational reforms in 11 European countries. I then instrument for educational attainment with a
regression discontinuity design that estimates the increase in education due to compulsory educational reforms.
Notably, it appears that omitted variables bias is important here. I find a significant causal effect of education
moving individuals to the right when properly addressing the endogeneity whereas there is a significant
association between education and left-wing political ideology when treating education as exogenous. I find that
on average, among the individuals compelled into additional education from these specific reforms, an

additional year of education moves individuals to the right of the political continuum by about 5–6%. However, I
also find no evidence of a causal effect on political ideology for a subgroup of countries.
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1. Introduction
Researchers have long been interested in the effect of education on political ideology. Most previous
evidence suggests that education is associated with a more liberal ideology (Dunn, 2011; Weakliem,
2002). Moreover, it is often stated or implied that education causes individuals to move to the political
left (for example, Dunn, 2011; Weakliem, 2002; Weil, 1985). However, to the author's knowledge,
previous studies on political ideology have not dealt with the endogeneity of education. Specifically,
previous cross-sectional research may suffer from omitted variables bias because there are likely
unobserved factors that affect political ideology and lead individuals to attain higher levels of
education. For example, innate personality characteristics or the political ideology of one's parents are
unobserved and can affect both educational attainment and one's own political ideology. Perhaps
more worrisome is that it is unclear what the direction of the bias in previous studies would be. There
are plausible stories as to how these unobserved factors could push one either to the political right or
to the left while simultaneously affecting educational attainment. Thus, previous studies are limited in
their ability to inform us on what would happen to political ideology in an alternative world where
individuals are compelled into more education.
In contrast, this paper contributes to the literature by estimating the causal effect of education on
political ideology as measured by self-identified left-right placement. The analysis overcomes the
endogeneity of education through leveraging changes in compulsory education laws in 20th century
Europe. The key feature of these law changes is that individuals were forced into additional education
rather than self-selecting into more education. This exogenous shift in educational attainment can then
be utilized to identify the effect of education on the outcome of interest. This instrumental variables
(IV) approach has now been firmly established in the literature and has been utilized to explain the
impact of education on a wide variety of outcomes.
Recent research suggests that the left-right scale as a construct is problematic. Specifically, Bauer,
Barbera, Ackermann, and Venetz (2015)argue that the left-right scale is a vague concept and empirical
relationships will be biased as a result. In particular, the authors provide evidence that education is
endogenous to self-placement on the left-right political scale in Germany. An omitted variable (the
meaning that individuals attach to the concepts of political “left” and “right”) is correlated with
education and self-placement on the left-right scale. In the typical analysis of the association between

education and left-right identity, we would not know “whether education affects ideology directly or
merely through the different associations it triggers within respondents” (Bauer et al., 2015). This is the
benefit of the identification strategy regression employed in the present paper. Rather than simply
using the reported level of education, I estimate educational attainment utilizing a regression
discontinuity design (RDD) that exploits the timing of compulsory educational reforms. One group of
individuals was born just prior to a reform and another group of individuals was born just after a
reform. After controlling for cohort trends, unobserved characteristics such as conceptual associations
should be on average the same across these two groups. Thus, I am plausibly able to overcome the
omitted variables problem detailed in Bauer et al. (2015).
Supporting the concerns of Bauer et al. (2015), I do find that the observed association between
education and left-right political identity from a standard OLS regression is quite different from the
causal relationship estimated utilizing the fuzzy RDD. There is a small but highly statistically significant
association between education and left-wing identity in the observational regressions that treat
education as exogenous. However, once leveraging the educational reforms as instruments for
endogenous educational attainment, I find that education significantly moves individuals to the right in
their political identities. Among individuals who were affected by the educational reforms (the
compliers), an additional year of education moves an individual to the right by approximately 0.2–0.4
points on a 10 point scale (4%–8% relative to sample mean) depending on the specification, with most
estimates falling near 0.25 (5% relative to sample mean). I primarily utilize parametric specifications of
a fuzzy RDD and find that the results are robust to linear and quadratic controls and to the sample
bandwidth chosen. However, I also use nonparametric local linear regressions to confirm the results.
There are several theses from the political science and sociology literatures regarding the effect of
educational attainment on political identity. As explained by Dunn (2011), these theories include “the
self-interest thesis, the developmental thesis and the socialization thesis.” The self-interest thesis
reasons that those who attain higher levels of education are likely to earn higher incomes, which
attracts them to a right-wing identity out of self-interest. As explained by Dunn (2011), this thesis can
explain the traditional European association of higher education leading to a right-wing
identification. Powdthavee and Oswald (2014) provide an analytical framework in which a rational
voter trades off a desire for low taxes with a desire for a public good. They show that an increase in
income can theoretically affect left-right political affiliation for such a utility maximizing
agent. Powdthavee and Oswald (2014) then provide evidence that an exogenous shock to income
through winning the lottery leads to significant movement to the right in political affiliation in the UK,
supporting the idea that individuals act out of self-interest when voting.

In contrast, the developmental thesis predicts that more education will lead to more of a left-wing
political identity. In this thesis, education expands one's perspective and stimulates cognitive growth,
leading to a more liberal ideology (Phelan, Link, Stueve, & Moore, 1995). Finally, the socialization thesis
maintains that political attitudes are transmitted to students through social learning processes.
Students learn about society's attitudes through the behaviors that are modeled and reinforced in the
educational system. A leading specific example of the socialization thesis is Weakliem's (2002) core
values thesis. In this theory, education serves to increase the commitment to society's core values and
institutions. Thus, more education would tend to move individuals to the right in predominantly
conservative societies and to the left in predominantly liberal societies.
Concerning the aforementioned theories, the primary finding in this paper that increased educational
attainment tends to move individuals to the right of the political spectrum could be consistent with
either the self-interest thesis or the socialization thesis and is inconsistent with the developmental
thesis. Closer examination of individual countries reveals most support for the self-interest thesis.
Specifically, education tends to have a stronger causal effect on political ideology in countries where
previous research has shown the reforms to be effective in increasing earnings and no causal effect in
countries where research has shown the reforms to not affect earnings.
Aside from the contribution to the literature on the relationship between educational attainment and
political attitudes, this paper adds to the growing literature concerning non-pecuniary effects of
education. Most often, researchers use changes in compulsory education laws as a source of
exogenous variation to identify the effects of interest. Much of this compulsory education literature
has focused on labor market outcomes such as income and employment (Aakvik, Salvanes, & Vaage,
2010; Acemoglu and Angrist, 2001; Angrist & Krueger, 1991; Brunello, Fort, & Weber, 2009; Meghir
and Palme, 2005; Oreopoulos, 2006a, b). More recently, non-pecuniary effects of education are
receiving more attention (Oreopoulos & Salvanes, 2011). For example, increases in education have
been shown to reduce crime (Hjalmarsson, Holmlund, & Lindquist, 2015; Lochner and Moretti, 2004;
Machin, Marie, & Vujic, 2011), reduce teenage births (Black, Devereux, & Salvanes, 2008), improve
health outcomes1 (Gathmann, Jürges, & Reinhold, 2015; Lleras-Muney, 2005; van Kippersluis,
O'Donnell, & van Doorslaer, 2011), and increase pro-environmental behavior (Meyer, 2015).
In the political realm, Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos (2004) and Dee (2004) find that increases in
education cause political involvement and voting to increase. However, there are also mixed results in
this area. Siedler (2010)finds little evidence of a causal effect of education on political behavior in
Germany. Borgonovi, d'Hombres, and Hoskins (2010) pool reforms from 15 European countries and
find that education increases political information acquisition but has no effect on voter turnout. Di

Pietro and Delprato (2009 )examine the effects of a compulsory education reform in Italy on a number
of civic outcomes. The authors find a positive and significant effect on interest in politics, a negative
and significant effect on the stated justifiability of not returning lost money to an owner and
insignificant effects on the justifiability of not paying a ticket on a public transport vehicle and of not
leaving one's name for the owner of a car one accidentally scraped, and an insignificant effect on the
stated importance of the problem of tax evasion. Most recently, Persson, Lindgren, and Oskarsson
(2016), leverage exogenous variation in school entry age in Greece, Norway, Slovenia, and Sweden to
estimate the casual effect of the ninth year of education; the authors find no significant effect on
political participation, democratic values, or political knowledge.
More generally, this study contributes to the literature that analyzes the determinants of voting
intentions and support for politicians. Most of this work concentrates on how economic conditions
affect voting intentions—often termed economic voting. For example, Veiga and Veiga (2004) find that
economic conditions are important in determining support for right-wing and left-wing governments in
Portugal. Sakurai and Menezes-Filho (2008) and Cassette, Farvaque, and Hericourt (2013) examine how
local public spending affect municipal elections in Brazil and France, respectively. Yet, the approach in
the present paper differs because it concentrates on a key individual-level determinant of political
identity rather than national or local factors. The present results do suggest, however, that voting
behavior could be influenced by public policies that change the level of required education. For
example, any public policies that reduce the number of high school dropouts could affect political
ideology. The results suggest that the effects would be largest in cases where the extra education is
effective in increasing earnings of the compliers.

2. Data
The analysis in this paper requires information about left-right political ideology and compulsory
education laws. 25 waves of Eurobarometer surveys provide the data on left-right political ideology
and several recent papers provide the needed information about compulsory education laws. The
European Commission regularly conducts population representative public opinion surveys of
European Citizens; these are Eurobarometer surveys. I identify 25 waves of Eurobarometer surveys
conducted between October 2004 and March 2012 that contain a question about left-right political
identification.2 Each wave collects data over a span of 1 to 3 months during the months of SeptemberMay.3 All waves utilized face-to-face interviews, where interviewers followed uniform protocols. Each
of the waves completed interviews with approximately 1000 individuals from each country and no
more than one individual was interviewed from each household. In addition to the left-right ideology
question, interviewers collect several demographic variables including gender, age, and age when the
individual left formal education.4 As in Meyer (2015), I assume that educational attainment increases

only until age 25 and exclude those who report an age of 36 or higher when they stopped full-time
education.5 Using the age when an individual stops education as a proxy of educational attainment is
not a perfect measure because of possible gaps in one's education. However, this will only bias the
estimated effect of reform on education if there are more people with gaps before or after a reform on
average.
Following Borgonovi et al. (2010), Brunello et al. (2009), Brunello, Fabbri, and Fort (2013), Gathmann et
al. (2015), and Meyer (2015), I elect to pool multiple educational reforms that occurred in 20th Century
Europe. I begin with the group of reforms detailed in Gathmann et al. (2015); these reforms were
implemented between 1900 and 1980.6 I then add the three remaining country-level reforms
from Brunello et al. (2009) that fall within this time period.7 This results in a list of 18 reforms from 11
Western European countries, which are summarized in Table 1. All of these reforms have been
leveraged as instruments in multiple studies. Fort (2006) documents the details of many of the
reforms. As mentioned in Fort (2006), the exact date that each reform began to affect the population is
sometimes in dispute. Thus, I follow Meyer (2015) in using implementation dates that are consistent
with Brunello et al. (2009) and Gathmann et al. (2015). These reforms increased the minimum
education level by 1 to 4 years and affected individuals born between 1917 and 1969. The typical
reform among this group moved the minimum leaving age up to the 9th or 10th grade. As previously
mentioned, the key attribute of these reforms is that they provide plausibly exogenous variation in
educational attainment. Individuals are compelled into the additional education rather than electing
the extra education because of unobserved factors.

Table 1. Reforms.
Country/region

Reform date First cohort potentially affected Change in min. schooling level Source

Austria

1962

1947

8–9

BR, F, GA

Belgium

1983

1969

8–12

BR, F

Denmark

1971

1957

7–9

AR, BR, F, GA

England and Wales 1947

1933

8–9

CR, DH, GA, HW, O

England and Wales 1973

1958

9–10

CR, GA, GR, HW

France

1937

1923

7–8

AL, F, GA

France

1959/1967

1953

8–10

AL, BR, F, GA, GR

Greece

1975

1963

6–9

B, F

Ireland

1972

1958

8–9

BR, CH, GA

Italy

1963

1949

5–9

BC, BR, F, GA, DD

Country/region

Reform date First cohort potentially affected Change in min. schooling level Source

Netherlands

1928

1917

6–7

GA, vK

Netherlands

1950

1938

7–9

GA, L

Netherlands

1973

1959

9–10

BR, F, GA, L

Northern Ireland

1957

1943

8–9

GA, F, O

Scotland

1946

1932

8–9

GA

Scotland

1976

1958

9–10

GA

Spain

1970

1957

6–8

BR, F, GA, P

Sweden

1962

1950

8–9

BR, F, HJ, M

Note: AL = Albouy and Lequien (2009), AR = Arendt (2005), BC = Brandolini and Cippolone (2002), BR = Brunello et al.
(2009), CH = Callan and Harmon (1999), CR = Clark and Royer (2013), DH = Devereux and Hart (2010), DD = Di Pietro and
Delprato (2009), F = Fort (2006), GA = Gathman et al. (2015), GR = Grenet (2013), HJ = Hjalmarsson et al. (2015), HW
= Harmon and Walker (1995), L = Levin and Plug (1999), M = Meghir and Palme (2005), O = Oreopoulos (2006a), P = Pons
and Gonzalo (2002), vK = van Kippersluis et al. (2011). Adapted from Ecological Economics, Vol. 116 No. 0, Meyer, A., “Does
Education Increase Pro-Environmental Behavior? Evidence from Europe”, Table 1, Page 111, Copyright (2015), with
permission from Elsevier.

The analysis only includes individuals born close enough to a change in the corresponding education
reform. Define the pivot cohort as the first cohort that was potentially affected by a change in
compulsory education law j and denote the birth year of the pivot cohort as bj. Let k = (b − bj) indicate
the number of years between the cohort from year b and the pivot cohort. Clearly, I need to know
when an individual was born to make this calculation. Some approximation is required here because
only age, not birth year, is reported on the survey. As discussed in Meyer (2015), one can be fairly
certain of the birth year from some survey waves. For example, Eurobarometer 68.2 was conducted in
the months of November 2007–January 2008. Nearly all of the respondents would have had their
birthday in calendar year 2007. It is less clear for other survey waves such as Eurobarometer 75.2
because it was conducted in the months of April-May 2011; there is a higher likelihood that an
individual would not have had their birthday in calendar year 2011 at the time of the survey.
Therefore, I code birth year as (year-age) for individuals in survey waves conducted between
September and December and (year-age-1) for individuals in survey waves conducted between January
and May.8
To begin, individuals with k ∈ [ − 10, −1] comprise the pre-reform sample and individuals with k ∈ [1,
10] make up the post-reform sample.9 In this bandwidth of ±10 years, there are 109,238 observations
from individuals who provide an answer to the question about educational attainment. I then narrow
the sample to include only individuals who provide an answer to the left-right political ideology

question, leaving 94,694 observations. The specific wording of the left-right political ideology question,
which is identical in all waves of the survey, is as follows, “In political matters people talk of the ‘the
left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale?” Interviewers then showed the
respondent a card with a 10 point scale, ranging from 1 (left) to 10 (right).
Table 2 shows the distribution of the answer to the left-right identity question for the 94,694
individuals who answer the question. In addition, I present a histogram to visualize the distribution
in Fig. 1. The distribution is approximately symmetric with a clear spike corresponding to the answer of
“5”. An answer of “5” likely indicates that an individual sees themselves as a centrist, not identifying
with either the left or the right. Table 3 summarizes this variable by country; there are only modest
differences in the averages across the sample countries. Table 4 provides summary statistics for each
of the variables. The average age when leaving full-time education for the sample is approximately
18.5, the sample is approximately 49% male, the average age is about 54 years, and the average
response to the left-right ideology question is 5.18. Moreover, a little more than one-half of the
individuals in the sample were affected by the educational reforms. The online appendix provides
summary statistics by country. The biggest differences across countries are in age, which is determined
by the date(s) of each country's reform(s), and in average age of leaving full-time education. For
example, the average age of leaving full-time education in some countries such as Spain, Italy, and UK
is less than 17 years whereas the average age of leaving education is as high as 21.38 in Denmark and
20.21 in Sweden.

Table 2. Summary of self-reported left-right placement.
Left-right
placement

N

Percent

Box 1 – left

3889

4.11

Box 2

4174

4.41

Box 3

11,479 12.12

Box 4

12,614 13.32

Box 5

26,231 27.70

Box 6

12,252 12.94

Box 7

11,443 12.08

Box 8

7772

8.21

Box 9

2016

2.13

Box 10 – right 2824

2.98

Left-right
placement

N

Percent

Total

94,694 100

Note: This summarizes the sample generated by a bandwidth of ±10 years.

Fig. 1. Political ideology. Note: Histogram displays frequency of respondents’ political ideology responses. 1 = far
left, 10 = far right.

Table 3. Left-right placement by country.
Country

N

Mean Std. Dev.

Austria

6263

5.26

1.95

Belgium

7657

5.07

1.89

Denmark

7571

5.29

2.11

Greece

6392

5.40

2.16

France

9535

5.01

1.99

Ireland

6972

5.60

1.82

Italy

5045

5.18

2.43

Netherlands

17,337 5.06

1.97

Spain

5926

4.50

1.94

Sweden

8605

5.32

2.16

United Kingdom 13,391 5.30

1.84

Note: This summarizes the sample generated by a bandwidth of ±10 years.

Table 4. Summary statistics.
Variable

N

Mean Std. Dev. Min Max

Bandwidth of ±10 years
Education age

94,694 18.50 3.84

0

25

Reform

94,694 0.531 0.499

0

1

Male

94,694 0.491 0.500

0

1

Age

94,694 54.22 11.70

25

97

Left identity

94,694 5.18

2.02

1

10

Education age

66,267 18.51 3.81

0

25

Reform

66,267 0.521 0.500

0

1

Male

66,267 0.489 0.500

0

1

Age

66,267 54.43 11.21

28

97

1

10

Bandwidth of ±7 years

Left right placement 66,267 5.16

2.01

3. Empirical strategy
The principal goal of this study is to estimate the impact of educational attainment on political
ideology, as measured by left-right identity. In the experimental ideal, one would randomly assign
individuals to different levels of education and then analyze differences in ideology across groups.
However, absent such a randomized controlled trial, individuals will self-select into different levels of
education and choose their political identity. Therefore, unobserved factors will likely impact both
educational attainment and political ideology. As such, the primary empirical concern is omitted
variables bias. I adopt an instrumental variables (IV) strategy to address endogeneity from the omitted
variables. Changes in compulsory educational laws have become the instrument of choice for
educational attainment in related research. Following this literature, I argue that changes in
compulsory education laws are valid as an instrument because these changes exogenously compel
individuals into higher educational attainment. That is, changes in these laws affect educational
attainment but are uncorrelated with other unobservable factors that affect the outcome of interest—
in this case political ideology.
Previous research establishes the positive impact of this set of reforms on average educational
attainment (Brunello et al., 2009; Brunello et al., 2013; Gathmann et al., 2015; Meyer, 2015).
Nevertheless, it is useful to graphically present evidence of a discrete jump in educational attainment
for the cohorts first affected by the reform in this particular sample. Recall that k is the interval in

number of years before or after the first affected cohort from each reform. Panels A and B of Fig. 2 plot
average education versus k for 10 years pre- and -post-reform. For Panel A, I then regress education
on k and k2 for two subsamples, once for the pre-reform period and once for the post-reform period.
Finally, I plot the fitted values from these regressions to show the trends in educational attainment.
Panel B of Fig. 2 shows the analogous graph for linear controls. Both panels of Fig. 2 show a
discontinuity in average educational attainment in the year of the reform. Individuals born in the
cohort immediately prior to a reform (k = −1) are predicted to leave formal education 0.37 years earlier
than individuals born in a cohort immediately following a reform (k = 1) in Panel A for quadratic
controls. The size of the discontinuity for linear controls in Panel B is 0.26 years. I also show the
analogous graphs using linear controls and bandwidths of 7 (Panel A) and 5 (Panel B) in Fig. 3. From Fig.
3, it appears that a linear functional form fits the data rather well in these narrowed bandwidths.

Fig. 2. Education age vs. interval (k), bandwidth of 10. Note: Average education values represent means of all
observations for a given interval (k). Fitted values are from separate regressions of education age on interval and
interval squared (Panel A) and education age on interval (Panel B). The interval of 0 corresponds to the pivot
cohort. Positive interval values correspond to individuals treated with educational reforms.

Fig. 3. Education age vs. interval (k), narrowed bandwidths. Note: average education values represent means of
all observations for a given interval (k). Fitted values are from separate regressions of education age on interval.
The interval of 0 corresponds to the pivot cohort. Positive interval values correspond to individuals treated with
educational reforms.

Following the approach utilized elsewhere in the literature, I utilize a fuzzy regression discontinuity
design (RDD) to identify the effect of compulsory education reforms on political ideology. This leads to
the following two-equation model specification for individual i from reform c.
(1)

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

and

=

𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑓𝑓(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝑿𝑿′𝒊𝒊𝑐𝑐 𝛽𝛽2
+𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

(2)

𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

=

𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑔𝑔(𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝑿𝑿′𝒊𝒊𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝛼2
+𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .

Here, f(kic) and g(kic) are controls for cohort trends, 𝑿𝑿′𝒊𝒊𝑐𝑐 is a vector of exogenous controls,10Ric is an
indicator for being affected by the educational reform, ReformFE is a set of reform fixed effects,
and SurveyFE is set of survey wave fixed effects.

Identification of α1 in the RDD requires that the potentially endogenous relationship between birth
cohort and educational attainment is captured by the controls, g(kic). After controlling for these cohort
trends, individuals on both sides of the pivot cohort should have the same average educational
attainment within some range. A discontinuous jump in educational attainment at the pivot cohort can
then be attributed to the reform. I allow the slope of the regression function to change at the pivot
cohort by interacting the linear or quadratic controls with the reform indicator, Ric. Therefore, with
quadratic controls,11Eq. (2) becomes
(3)

𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑐𝑐

=

2
𝛼𝛼0 + 𝛼𝛼1 𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾1 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾2 (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝛾𝛾3 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2
+𝛾𝛾4 (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
) + 𝑿𝑿′𝒊𝒊𝑐𝑐 𝛼𝛼2
+𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .

Eq. (1) is then analogously modified to substitute the appropriate linear or quadratic controls for f(kic),
resulting in
(4)

𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

=

2
𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆1 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆2 (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) + 𝜆𝜆3 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
2
+𝜆𝜆4 (𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∗ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
) + 𝑿𝑿′𝒊𝒊𝑐𝑐 𝛽𝛽2
+𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 + 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖

for the case of quadratic controls.12 Furthermore, I interact the linear/quadratic controls in Eqs. (3) and
(4) with a set of reform dummies so that each reform can take on its own trend.13
I initially set the bandwidth at ±10 years, which produces the maximum sample size with no individual
being counted as part of both the pre- and –post-reform groups. This also corresponds to the window
chosen by Gathmann et al. (2015). I then decrease the bandwidth to ±7 years as a specification check.
A 7 year bandwidth substantially cuts the sample size but matches the window chosen by Brunello et
al. (2009). The tradeoff is that wider bandwidths provide more power but may increase the probability
that the included controls do not adequately capture cohort trends. Moreover, I report results for all
other possible bandwidths of 2–6 and 8–9 years.
As previously mentioned, I exclude individuals from the pivot cohort because I cannot reliably
determine whether or not they were treated with the reform. Therefore, I am effectively utilizing a
“donut-hole” RD estimator.14 Previous studies have shown that this strategy can be advantageous for
reasons beyond measurement error. One typical issue in RD estimation is the possibility of
manipulation of the forcing variable (Lee & Lemieux, 2010; McCrary, 2008); the “donut-hole” approach
can be useful if one suspects such manipulation. For example, Barreca, Guldi, Lindo and Waddell

(2011) revisit the conclusions of Almond, Doyle, Kowalski, and Williams (2010) regarding the reduction
in 1-year infant mortality as birth weight crosses the 1500 g “very-low-birth-weight (VLBW)”
threshold. Barreca et al. (2011) note that the observations occurring at this important threshold are
systematically different from those on either side of the threshold so including these threshold
observations can bias results. Furthermore, the authors argue that RD estimates should not be
sensitive to the observations at the threshold so it can be useful to remove a “donut-hole” of
observations (Barreca et al., 2011). Due to merging 25 different waves of surveys with inconsistent
demographic questions, I do not have the ability to test for differences in observable characteristics
from individuals in different birth cohorts. In the present context, therefore, one advantage of the
donut-hole RD is that it allows for the possibility that individuals born in the pivot cohort are
systematically different from the surrounding cohorts.15
Consistent with previous studies in this literature (Brunello et al., 2009; Gathmann et al., 2015; Grenet,
2013; Meyer, 2015), I view these as parametric regression specifications. This implicitly assumes that
we know the functional form. Many recent RDD papers instead use nonparametric local polynomial
regression, which is more appropriate if we are treating the functional form as unknown. Therefore, I
also report results using local linear specifications of the fuzzy RDD instead of the parametric global
polynomial approach. I utilize a triangular kernel to weight observations and a local quadratic
polynomial for bias correction. I select the bandwidth in two ways; I first use the cross-validation
procedure from Ludwig and Miller (2007) and then use the Imbens and Kalyanaraman
(2012) approach. In each case, I present conventional and bias corrected point estimates along with
conventional and robust (Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik, 2014a) standard errors.16

4. Results and discussion
4.1. Main results
To begin, columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 present 2SLS results from the bandwidths of ±10 years from a
pivot cohort. Column 1 uses linear controls while column 2 uses quadratic controls. Error terms may
possibly be correlated between individuals from the same reform group and birth cohort. As such, I
cluster standard errors at the birth year-reform level.17 I do find a statistically significant local average
treatment effect (LATE) of educational attainment on left-right ideology. An additional year of
educational attainment leads to an approximate 0.25 point movement to the right on the 10 point
scale. Relative to the sample mean of political affiliation, this represents an approximate 5% movement
to the right.

Table 5. 2SLS regression results.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

2SLS

2SLS

2SLS

2SLS

2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right
Education age

Male

Age

Age2

0.256**

0.235**

0.249**

0.269*

(0.120)

(0.116)

(0.107)

(0.157)

0.0466

0.0533

0.0549

0.0491

(0.0460)

(0.0445)

(0.0459)

(0.0578)

0.0332

0.0336

0.0526

0.0582

(0.0273)

(0.0267)

(0.0321)

(0.0408)

−0.000357 −0.000361 −0.000483* −0.000534
(0.000228) (0.000225) (0.000264)

(0.000345)

1st stage. Outcome is education age.
Reform

Male

Age

Age2

0.253***

0.372***

0.316***

0.332***

(0.0487)

(0.0841)

(0.0603)

(0.111)

0.323***

0.323***

0.322***

0.323***

(0.0224)

(0.0224)

(0.0266)

(0.0267)

−0.168***

−0.176***

−0.232***

−0.232***

(0.0248)

(0.0250)

(0.0309)

(0.0310)

0.00145***

0.00151***

0.00195***

0.00195***

(0.000207) (0.000209) (0.000258)

(0.000259)

F-Stat

310.85

216.94

219.13

152.66

(p-value)

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

F-Stat on excluded instrument 24.02

24.00

28.11

12.77

(p-value)

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

0.0004

Bandwidth

±10

±10

±7

±7

Cohort trends

Linear

Quadratic

Linear

Quadratic

N

94,694

94,694

66,267

66,267

Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level.
All regressions include cohort trends that can vary at the reform level, reform fixed effects, and survey wave
fixed effects.
***p < 0.01,

**p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1.

As a specification check, I next decrease the bandwidth to ±7 years in columns 3 and 4 of Table 5. The
estimated effects of education on political ideology are rather similar to their counterparts in columns
1 and 2. I also show abbreviated results for bandwidths of 2–6 and 8–9 years in Table 6 for the case of
linear cohort trends. As seen in Table 6, an extra year of education leads to a movement to the right of
0.22–0.47 across the various bandwidths, with most of the point estimates concentrated around 0.25.

Table 6. 2SLS regression results, alternative bandwidths.
Bandwidth

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

±9

±8

±6

±5

±4

±3

±2

0.470**

2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right
Education age

0.241**

0.220**

0.224**

0.258**

0.331*

0.282*

(0.112)

(0.111)

(0.0967) (0.120)

(0.174)

(0.149) (0.237)

0.293***

0.357***

0.257***

0.326*** 0.260*

1st stage. Outcome is education age.
Reform

0.270***

0.306***

(0.0519) (0.0555) (0.0662) (0.0743) (0.0867) (0.107) (0.158)
F-Stat on excluded instrument 24.54

26.17

33.61

20.86

11.30

13.65

10.80

(p-value)

<0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 <0.0001 0.001

0.0003

0.0016

N

85,344

28,195

18,647

76,056

56,842

47,212

37,558

Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level.
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level,
reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects.
***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1

When using 2SLS one may be concerned about the possibility of weak instruments. Therefore, I
present first stage regression results in Tables 5 and 6. The first stage results from all specifications
show that the educational reform does have a statistically significant positive effect. Moreover, the Fstats are all above the rule of thumb value of 10 (Stock, Wright, & Yogo, 2002). Furthermore, the
magnitude of the first stage effect is in line with previous studies. Using many of the same
reforms, Gathmann et al. (2015)report a first stage of 0.501 (men)/0.541 women and Brunello et al.
(2009)show an average first stage of around 0.3. With a slightly different set of reforms, Borgonovi et
al. (2010) report a first stage of 0.508.

All results presented thus far have attempted to deal with the endogeneity of education. However, it is
illustrative to examine the results when treating education as exogenous. Thus, Table 7 shows OLS
results from 4 representative bandwidths. As seen across the columns of Table 7, there is a statistically
significant association between educational attainment and left-leaning ideology when treating
education as exogenous. This could suggest that unobservable characteristics tend to move individuals
toward a left political ideology as educational attainment increases. Alternatively, it could be that the
subgroup of compliers–those who take up treatment from the instrument–is different from the
general population. In the context of these compulsory educational reforms, the compliers are likely
located in the lower end of the educational attainment distribution. Thus, one should interpret the
findings in this paper as representing the effect of education on political identity at the lower end of
the educational distribution and for these particular reforms.

Table 7. Exogenous education regression results: OLS.
Bandwidth

(1)

(2)

(2)

(3)

±10

±7

±5

±2

Education age −0.0149*** −0.0163*** −0.0189*** −0.0223***
(0.00347) (0.00408) (0.00468) (0.00698)
Male

N

0.136***

0.142***

0.137***

0.130***

(0.0181)

(0.0217)

(0.0260)

(0.0404)

94,694

66,267

47,212

18,647

Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. All regressions include a
quadratic of age, reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects.
***p < 0.01,

4.2. Ordered probit results
The results presented so far treat the left-right affiliation as a continuous variable and assume a
constant marginal effect of education on political affiliation. This is likely a fine approximation but I also
address this issue by estimating two ordered probit specifications that use all available observations
and treat educational attainment as endogenous. The ordered probit model utilizes Eqs. (3) and (4),
but substitutes a latent index in place of the continuous left-hand side variable in Eq. (4).18 IV ordered
probit specification 1 (IVOP1) codes the dependent variable into 3 categories (original responses of 1
through 4 = “1”, 5 = “2”, 6 through 10 = “3”). IV ordered probit specification 2 (IVOP2) codes the
dependent variable into 5 categories (original responses of 1 or 2 = “1”, 3 or 4 = “2”, 5 = “3”, 6 or 7 =
“4”, 8 through 10 = “5”). The main drawback of the ordered probit model is that interpretation is more
complicated. In interpreting the impact of educational attainment on political identity, there are as

many marginal effects as categories of the dependent variable. IVOP1 has the simpler interpretation as
the categories correspond to “left,” “center,” and “right.” IVOP2 is more flexible and attempts to group
the values of the dependent variable according to the patterns visible in Fig. 1.
Table 8 presents maximum likelihood results from the two ordered probit specifications for linear
controls and a bandwidth of ±7 years. As seen in Table 8, the ordered probit results are consistent with
the baseline 2SLS results. The positive signs on the coefficients on education across the columns
indicate that, when accounting for the endogeneity of education, additional educational attainment
moves individuals to the right of the political scale. However, one must examine the average marginal
effects to infer the magnitude of the change. The interpretation of the marginal effects is most
straightforward in column 1 from IVOP1 so I concentrate on those but note that the results in column 2
from IVOP2 tell a similar story. Results in column 1 suggest that an extra year of educational
attainment decreases the probability of falling into the left category (1–4) by approximately 4
percentage points and increases the probability of falling into the right category (6–10) by a similar
magnitude. There is a statistically significant decrease in the probability of falling into the center
category (5) with more education; however, this effect has near 0 magnitude. Therefore, overall, the
results from Table 8support the baseline analysis in showing that additional educational attainment
moves individuals to the right.

Table 8. IV ordered probit regression results.
(1)

(2)

Variables

MLE (IVOP1) MLE (IVOP2)

Education age

0.121***

0.103**

(0.0442)

(0.0437)

3.95**

2.24

(1.79)

(1.91)

4.60***

3.14*

(1.76)

(1.87)

Cutpoints
Cut1

Cut2

Cut3

3.82**
(1.84)

Cut4

4.58**
(1.81)

(1)
Variables

(2)

MLE (IVOP1) MLE (IVOP2)

Average ME of education
Left (1–4)

−0.0416***
(0.0140)

Far Left (1–2)

−0.0184*
(0.00989)

Center Left (3–4)

−0.0175***
(0.00445)

Center (5)

−0.00108***

−0.00106***

(0.00011)

(0.00017)

Center Right (6–7)

0.0134***
(0.00301)

Far Right (8–10)

0.0236**
(0.0115)

Right (6–10)

0.0427***
(0.0140)

Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level.
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level,
reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects. N = 66,267. The bandwidth is ±7 years.
Average ME's of education are calculated using Stata's margins command.
***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1

4.3. Discussion of theories and country-specific results
The developmental thesis predicts that education will move individuals to a more liberal ideology and
is hence not supported by the results presented in the preceding sections. In contrast, according to the
self-interest thesis, individuals will move to the right out of self-interest when their incomes increase.
Previous research establishes that many of these reforms increased earnings for the compliers.
However, other papers find small or no effects on earnings. Appendix Table A1 summarizes previous
studies of the compulsory education reforms utilized in this paper and shows that there is strongest
prior evidence of significant earnings increases for the UK reforms and some evidence of earnings
increases for Italy and Netherlands. Thus, if the self-interest thesis is correct, we should see more
movement to the political right in these countries. Likewise, we should not see significant movement

to the right in countries such as France or Sweden where the reforms have not been shown to
significantly affect earnings. Hence, instead of pooling together all the reforms and running one
analysis, I estimate the model on each of the countries separately. Table 9 shows the LATE of education
on political ideology by country. To probe the stability of the results, I present 4 bandwidths for each
country. The sample size drastically decreases when examining one country at a time which cuts
statistical power, but the point estimates are informative. The second stage point estimates are
consistently positive for 3 of the 11 countries (Italy, Netherlands, and UK), consistently negative for 1
country (Spain), and sometimes positive/sometimes negative for 7 of the countries (Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, and Sweden). However, the standard errors are large for most of
these estimates so I typically cannot reject the null of 0 effect at conventional levels. In support of the
self-interest thesis, I find some evidence that the Italian reform moved individuals to the right and no
evidence that the French reforms affected political ideology. I also find weak evidence that the UK
reforms may have moved individuals to the right, but the estimates are never significant at
conventional levels. There is some evidence that the Swedish reform moved individuals to the right but
the result does not appear robust to the bandwidth selection. As seen in Table A1, Meghir and Palme
(2005) find little evidence that this reform increased earnings, with a small positive point estimate.
Therefore, overall, the country-specific results are consistent with the predictions of the self-interest
thesis.

Table 9. Regression results by country.
Country/region

N

2nd stage effect of
Bandwidth education on political
ideology

1st stage effect of
reform on education

1st stage F-Stat on
excluded instrument

Austria

4403

7

−1.92 (3.84)

−0.105 (0.200)

0.279

Austria

6263

10

−0.647 (0.514)

−0.296*(0.161)

3.39

Austria

5690

9

−0.485 (0.461)

−0.311*(0.170)

3.33

Austria

3774

6

0.0496 (0.183)

−0.00241 (0.219)

0.000122

Belgium

5380

7

0.230 (0.572)

0.212 (0.162)

1.71

Belgium

7657

10

0.0269 (0.338)

0.277** (0.131)

4.50

Belgium

6930

9

0.0328 (0.408)

0.242* (0.139)

3.04

Belgium

4641

6

−0.102 (0.476)

0.266 (0.177)

2.25

Denmark

5093

7

−0.197 (0.564)

0.250 (0.285)

0.771

Denmark

7571

10

0.474 (0.628)

0.248 (0.224)

1.22

Denmark

6718

9

0.244 (0.421)

0.313 (0.242)

1.68

Country/region

N

2nd stage effect of
Bandwidth education on political
ideology

1st stage effect of
reform on education

1st stage F-Stat on
excluded instrument

Denmark

4339

6

−0.137(0.364)

0.414 (0.314)

1.74

France

6748

7

0.0357 (0.227)

0.474** (0.189)

6.32

France

9535

10

−0.277 (0.324)

0.297** (0.153)

3.78

France

8570

9

−0.104 (0.227)

0.414***(0.163)

6.46

France

5746

6

−0.000035 (0.201)

0.585***(0.207)

8.03

Greece

4628

7

0.700 (0.652)

0.357 (0.246)

2.12

Greece

6392

10

−0.0531 (0.371)

0.307 (0.201)

2.35

Greece

5833

9

0.205 (0.437)

0.305 (0.213)

2.04

Greece

3965

6

0.855 (1.18)

0.246 (0.270)

0.829

Ireland

4803

7

−0.152 (1.61)

−0.0739 (0.162)

0.208

Ireland

6972

10

−0.358 (0.958)

−0.109 (0.132)

0.687

Ireland

6287

9

−0.0284 (1.02)

−0.0975 (0.140)

0.486

Ireland

4087

6

0.905 (3.21)

−0.0652 (0.182)

0.128

Italy

3532

7

0.339 (0.220)

0.911*** (0.306)

8.85

Italy

5045

10

0.339* (0.196)

0.836***(0.248)

11.37

Italy

4538

9

0.304* (0.178)

0.953***(0.263)

13.10

Italy

3071

6

0.358** (0.172)

1.31*** (0.339)

14.80

Netherlands

11,912 7

0.540 (0.413)

0.286** (0.142)

4.04

Netherlands

17,337 10

1.58 (1.53)

0.131 (0.115)

1.30

Netherlands

15,562 9

0.994 (0.861)

0.171 (0.122)

1.95

Netherlands

10,207 6

0.615 (0.542)

0.256* (0.157)

2.66

Spain

4067

7

−0.993 (1.30)

0.239 (0.288)

0.691

Spain

5926

10

−0.871 (2.27)

0.101 (0.231)

0.190

Spain

5316

9

−0.381 (25.33)

0.0376 (0.249)

0.0227

Spain

3451

6

−4.93 (38.1)

0.0413 (0.320)

0.0167

Sweden

6192

7

0.316 (0.255)

0.542***(0.212)

6.50

Sweden

8605

10

−0.150 (0.181)

0.581***(0.173)

11.24

Sweden

7835

9

0.0481 (0.181)

0.588***(0.184)

10.18

Sweden

5339

6

0.488* (0.288)

0.601***(0.233)

6.68

Country/region

N

2nd stage effect of
Bandwidth education on political
ideology

1st stage effect of
reform on education

1st stage F-Stat on
excluded instrument

UK

9509

7

0.0906 (0.237)

0.355***(0.123)

8.37

UK

13,391 10

0.311 (0.256)

0.290***(0.0993)

8.54

UK

12,085 9

0.249 (0.257)

0.298***(0.106)

7.93

UK

8222

0.0414 (0.239)

0.383***(0.133)

8.26

6

Heteroskedastic robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Linear cohort trends, gender, and a quadratic of age are included.
***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1

Under the socialization thesis, individuals affected by the educational reforms simply learn more about
the core values of their society. To the extent that the educational system explicitly or implicitly taught
core values associated with a right-wing status, an additional year of education could push the
individuals in that direction. I do not have information about how the explicit curricula may have
differed across the different countries but there are ways to group countries by core values. One
leading typology relies on classifying the welfare regime. Esping-Anderson (1990, 1999) divides
European countries into three welfare regimes: liberal, conservative, and social democratic.19Liberal
countries include Ireland and the UK. Social democratic countries include Denmark and Sweden.
Conservative countries include Austria, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. Again referring to
the country-specific results in Table 9, I find evidence that both supports and conflicts with the
socialization thesis. Second stage results are strongest for Italy, where it appears that more education
moves individuals to the political right. This is supportive of the socialization thesis because Italy is
classified as a conservative country. However, Sweden is classified as a social democratic country so
the weak positive and significant result disagrees with the socialization thesis. The other two countries
with consistently positive point estimates across the bandwidths, Netherlands and UK, fall respectively
into Esping-Anderson's conservative and liberal (neo-liberal, laissez-faire) groupings, which appears
consistent with the socialization thesis. However, the results that agree with the socialization thesis
under Esping-Anderson's classification only happen in instances where the results also agree with the
self-interest thesis.
I use one more metric to gauge the dominant core values of each country. For each country, I take the
average of the left-right placement value for individuals who were 21 years or older when stopping
full-time education. Recall that the compulsory education reforms primarily affected individuals in the
lower end of the education distribution so this measure would reflect the left-right ideology of the

peers who were not affected. Appendix Table A2 summarizes these averages by country and shows
that the most left-leaning countries for this sample are Spain, France, and Netherlands. The most rightleaning countries are Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden. Belgium, Greece, and UK fall in
between the others. Appendix Table A3 shows 2SLS results on these groupings of countries. I find no
effect of education on political ideology when limiting the sample to the left-leaning countries in
column 1 but the first stage is somewhat weak. Moreover, the effect does seem strongest in the rightleaning countries (0.390 in column 2). This LATE for right-leaning countries is approximately 57% larger
than the overall LATE in Table 5 but it is also less precisely estimated with a borderline weak first stage.
Column 5 of Table A3 shows a LATE of 0.344 when excluding the left-leaning countries of Spain, France,
and Netherlands and column 4 of Table A3shows a statistically insignificant LATE of 0.173 when
excluding the right-leaning countries of Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden. Thus, I find no
evidence that education moves individuals to the left for left-leaning countries. This suggests that the
socialization thesis is not very potent but societal values may either dampen or intensify any selfinterested movement to the right.
It is also informative to examine the first stage estimates of the effect of an educational reform on
years of education by country. As seen in Table 9, several of the countries display little evidence of
reforms increasing educational attainment. Three such countries (Austria, Ireland, and Spain) produce
negative second stage point estimates for most of the bandwidths. Previous studies also find the
reforms in Spain (Pons and Gonzalo, 2002) and Ireland (Callan and Harmon, 1999) to be rather
ineffective in increasing average educational attainment, and hence weak instruments. Across the
countries, I find first stage effects that are mostly in line with previous studies. I find a first stage effect
for the UK reforms (0.290–0.383) in Table 9 that is consistent with previous studies from Table A1. The
first stage effect is comparatively high for France for shorter bandwidths, but comparable to previous
studies for the bandwidth of 10. I estimate a first stage effect for Italy that is considerably higher than
the effect found in Brandolini and Cippolone (2002) but lower than the first stage effect from Di Pietro
and Delprato (2009). Likewise, the first stage effect in Table 9 for Netherlands falls between those
found by Levin and Plug (1999) and van Kippersluis et al. (2011). For Denmark, the first stage in Table
9 is similar to that found by Arendt (2005). Finally, I estimate a first stage effect for Sweden that is
somewhat higher than that found by Meghir and Palme (2005). However, Meghir and Palme
(2005)have a more refined regional educational reform measure which could explain some of the
difference.20 Supporting this notion, the first stage effects from Hjalmarsson et al. (2015) when not
including municipality fixed effects are similar to what I find in Table 9 but similar to Meghir and Palme
(2005) when including the municipality effects.

4.4. Robustness checks
Here, I conduct a series of robustness checks. In each case, I set the bandwidth at ±7 years and utilize
linear cohort controls.21 First, I exclude the countries that have the weakest or negative first stage
effects of the reforms on educational attainment (Austria, Ireland, and Spain). As seen in column 1
of Table 10, the second stage estimated LATE increases only slightly and becomes more precise. In
Column 2, I restrict the sample further to countries that have the strongest evidence of the reforms
increasing educational attainment (France, Italy, Sweden, and UK). The second stage estimated LATE
decreases to approximately 0.19 (3.7% of the sample mean) but remains significant at the 5% level.
Next, recall that I exclude individuals from the pivot cohorts in the baseline analysis. Column 3 of Table
10 shows results when I include individuals from the pivot cohorts. As would be expected, the
magnitude of the first stage decreases somewhat here because some individuals who were not actually
treated with the reform are being coded as though they were treated. Nonetheless, the impact of
education on political affiliation remains significant at the 10% level. In column 4 of Table 10, rather
than allowing each reform to take on its own trend, I estimate the model with a common trend. Again,
there is only a slight change to the point estimates and the second stage estimate remains significant
at the 10% level.

Table 10. 2SLS regression results, robustness.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Selected
countries

Selected
countries

Include
pivot
cohort

Common
Trend

Exclude
Cluster SE
Survey FE at Reform
Level

(7)

(8)

Include
Regional
Germany
Reforms

Exclude
Leftright = 5

2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right
Education age

0.262***

0.191**

0.190*

0.296*

0.248**

0.249**

0.238**

0.312**

(0.0978)

(0.0936)

(0.114)

(0.159)

(0.107)

(0.116)

(0.109)

(0.141)

1st stage. Outcome is education age.
Reform

0.390***

0.508***

0.249***

0.304***

0.315***

0.316***

0.292***

0.352***

(0.0685)

(0.0918)

(0.0548)

(0.0777)

(0.0594)

(0.0657)

(0.0566)

(0.0727)

F-Stat on
excluded
instrument

33.44

30.64

20.66

15.30

28.13

21.15

26.66

24.23

(p-value)

<0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

0.0001

<0.0001

0.0003

<0.0001

<0.0001

N

52,994

25,981

70,685

66,267

66,267

66,267

71,419

47,784

Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level (except column 6). The
bandwidth is ±7 years.

All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects
(except (5)).
All except column 4 include linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level.
Column 1 includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, and UK. Column 2 includes
France, Italy, Sweden, and UK.
Column 4 includes a common cohort trend that does not vary at the reform level.
***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1

Next in column 5, I exclude the survey wave fixed effect. In column 6, I cluster standard errors at the
reform level instead of the baseline birth year-reform level. In column 7, I include the regional reforms
in Germany that are utilized by Brunello et al. (2009), assuming that individuals were educated in the
same region in which they lived at the time of the survey. Finally in column 8, I exclude individuals who
report a left-right political affiliation of 5 (centrist) in case they are fundamentally different in some
way. As seen in columns 5–8 of Table 10, the magnitude of the estimated LATE changes only modestly
for these robustness checks and the estimates remain significant at the 5% level.
Another issue is that there are a relatively large number of individuals, approximately 13% of the
sample, who refuse to answer the political affiliation question. This could be an indication that the
individual is not politically engaged. Recall that these individuals are dropped from the main analysis.
Therefore, I alternatively include these individuals in the sample and create a dichotomous variable for
refusal to answer the political affiliation question. I replace “ideology” with this dichotomous refusal
variable (1 = refuse, 0 = answer) in Eq. 4 and estimate the model with 2SLS. I do not find any statistical
evidence that education affects the probability of refusing to answer this question.22 Likewise, one may
wonder if education significantly affects the probability responding with a “5” to the political ideology
question given the large spike seen in Fig. 1. Using the same samples from Table 5, I replace “ideology”
with a dichotomous dependent variable (1 = ideology of 5, 0 = other) and estimate the model with
2SLS. I find no evidence that education affects the probability of identifying as a political centrist.23
As I am pooling reforms from many different countries, one may wonder whether it is one particular
country that is driving the results. To investigate this issue I omit one country at a time from the
sample and re-estimate the model. Appendix Table A4 shows that it is not any one country that is
responsible for the estimated effect. The estimated first stage effect of the reform on education always
stays between 0.284 and 0.346. Also, although the precision of the estimated LATE changes depending
on which country is omitted, the scale is always between 0.206 and 0.306 and always significant at
conventional levels.

Finally, I report a series of falsification tests. In appendix Table A5, I show RD estimates for six different
false reform dates. In each case, I utilize the maximum bandwidth for the falsified reform dates that
does not overlap with the true reform. For example, in column 1 of Table A5, I move each educational
reform back in time by 4 years relative to the true reform dates. In column 2 of Table A5, I move each
reform forward by 4 years. I then repeat this process for ±7 years and ±10 years relative to the true
reform dates.24 As seen in Table A5, I find no evidence that these false reform dates significantly affect
educational attainment; the first stage point estimates on “reform” are near 0 and have large standard
errors. Furthermore, the second stage effect of education on political affiliation is never statistically
significant while the point estimates are sometimes negative and sometimes positive. Table A5
presents another set of falsification tests. In columns 1 and 2, I draw a random number from the
uniform distribution over the interval of [1917, 1969] for each reform and assign this random year as
the first affected birth cohort.25 In contrast, in columns 3 and 4, I use the true reform dates but
randomly assign a false level of educational attainment to each individual.26 Once again, there is no
evidence that these falsified reforms affect educational attainment or political ideology in columns 1
and 2. Likewise, there are no statistically significant findings for the falsified educational attainment in
columns 3 and 4.

4.5. Local linear fuzzy RD results
Table 11 reports the nonparametric local linear fuzzy RD results. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 11 show
results for two different optimal bandwidth choices. Column 3 shows results when I manually set the
bandwidth to approximately 50% of the optimal bandwidth (±5 years). Then, columns 4–5 report
results for bandwidths of 7 and 10 to compare with the main parametric results in Table 5. The
conventional and bias-corrected local linear results are statistically significant and similar in magnitude
to the main parametric results in Section 4.1 when using the optimal bandwidths and conventional
inference.27 Results for the manual bandwidths in columns 3–5 are statistically significant at
conventional levels only in some cases and statistical significance does not hold up when using the
robust inference suggested by Calonico et al. (2014a). However, overall, the local linear results agree
with the magnitude and sign of the parametric results of Section 4.1.

Table 11. Local linear fuzzy RD estimates.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Structural estimates (2nd stage). Outcome is left-right affiliation
Conventional

0.303*

0.298*

0.353

0.285*

0.320*

(0.156)

(0.156)

(0.250) (0.165)

(0.165)

Bias-corrected 0.306**

0.509***

0.516**

0.261

0.431***

Robust

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(0.156)

(0.156)

(0.250) (0.165)

(0.165)

0.306

0.509

0.516

0.261

(0.277)

(0.379)

(0.554) (0.313)

0.431

(5)

(0.285)

1st stage. Outcome is education age.
Reform

0.262***

0.278***

0.265*** 0.291***

0.236***

(0.0658) (0.0699) (0.102) (0.0781) (0.0615)
N

76,056

76,056

37,558

BW type

CV

IK

Manual Manual

Manual

BW local poly

9.0

8.14

5.0

7.0

10.0

BW bias

9.0

6.68

5.0

7.0

10.0

56,842

85,344

Local linear regressions used for point estimators. Local quadratic regressions used for bias correction.
Triangular kernel used in all cases. BW=bandwidth.
CV=optimal BW selected by cross-validation procedure (Ludwig & Miller, 2007)
IK=optimal BW selected according to method of Imbens and Kalyanaraman (2012).
All estimates are generated using the rdrobust package in Stata. Conventional 1st stage estimates are reported.
***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1

5. Conclusion
In this article, I use data from 11 European countries to identify the effect of increasing educational
attainment on political ideology as measured by self-placement on a left-right scale. Following a
technique now well established in the literature, I instrument for educational attainment with 18
compulsory education laws that increased the minimum school leaving age in these 11 countries
during 20th century Europe. This provides an advantage over previous work that has examined the link
between education and political ideology as I am able to produce the first causal estimates of the
education moving some individuals along the political spectrum. Furthermore, these results also add to
the growing literature concerning the non-pecuniary effects of education. Overall, I find robust
evidence that an extra year of education moves the average reform complier to the right of the
political continuum by approximately 5%.
Previous work provides conflicting theoretical predictions concerning the effect of educational
attainment on political ideology. The self-interest thesis predicts that individuals will move to the right
with more education whereas the developmental thesis predicts that individuals will move to the left
with more education. The socialization thesis, on the other hand, predicts that the effect of

educational attainment will depend upon the values of the society. In the socialization theory,
education will tend to move individuals to the right in more right-leaning societies and to the left in
more left-leaning societies. In the present study, when pooling all of the reforms, I find that education
moves individuals to the right on average. An analysis of each country independently shows that the
strongest results occur where previous research has documented a positive return to earnings from
the educational reforms. Education appears to have no causal effect on left-right political affiliation in
countries where previous research has shown reforms to be ineffective in increasing earnings. This
suggests that the likely causal mechanism is that education increases earnings, which then moves
individuals to the right; this is consistent with the self-interest thesis.
This study adds to the growing evidence that individuals tend to support political ideologies that are
aligned with one's own self-interest. Doherty, Gerber, and Green (2006) show that larger lottery
winnings leads to less support of redistribution and more support of eliminating the estate tax.
Likewise, Powdthavee and Oswald (2014) show that lottery winners increase their probability of voting
right by approximately 4 percentage points. Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) empirically show that
having a daughter moves one to the political left and having a son moves one to the political right, and
theoretically shows why this can be in one's self-interest. In their sample of individuals from the UK, a
parent is approximately 2 percentage points more (less) likely to vote left for each daughter (son).
Thus, the scale of the LATE herein is about the same size as the estimated effect from Powdthavee and
Oswald (2014) and twice the size of that from Oswald and Powdthavee (2010). However, one may
expect the effect to be comparatively larger in the present case because the survey is taking place
typically many years after the educational reform treatment and it may take some time for political
views to evolve whereas Powdthavee and Oswald (2014) and Oswald and Powdthavee (2010) are
identifying the more immediate effects on political ideology.

As in any instrumental variables identification strategy, these results apply for the specific instrument
utilized and for the specific subgroup of individuals who are affected by the instrument. These
compliers in this context would come from the lower end of the schooling distribution. Therefore, we
should not use these results to infer what would happen in a very different context, for example the
United States, under a different compulsory education reform. Similarly, these results cannot speak to
the causal effect of education at the higher end of the educational attainment distribution such as the
effect on political identity of treating individuals with another year of college. One would need a
different instrument that affects individuals in this range of education to answer this question.
Finally, the results in this paper support the assessment of Bauer et al. (2015)that there can be
problems with observational studies linking education to left-right identity. I find a positive association

between educational attainment and left-wing political ideology when failing to account for the
endogeneity of education. An analysis that treats education as exogenous will likely suffer from
omitted variables bias and the results herein show that the extent of the bias can be significant.
Furthermore, there are reasons to believe in this context that multiple omitted variables may play a
role and they may work in opposite directions. Thus, I would caution against inferring causality from
studies that do not have an identification strategy to overcome this omitted variables problem.
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Appendix
Table A1. Reforms from the literature.
Country/region Study

Reform date

Gender 1st stage

Ln earnings
effect

Denmark

Arendt (2005)

1971

Men

0.262

N/A

Denmark

Arendt (2005)

1971

Women 0.166

N/A

England, Wales Clark and Royer (2013)

1947

All

0.450***

N/A

England, Wales Devereux and Hart (2010)

1947

All

0.506***

0.021

England, Wales Devereux and Hart (2010)

1947

Men

0.47***

0.037**

England, Wales Devereux and Hart (2010)

1947

Women 0.55***

−0.003

England, Wales Clark and Royer (2013)

1972/73

All

N/A

England, Wales Grenet (2013)

1972/73

Women 0.310***

0.067***

England, Wales Grenet (2013)

1972/73

Men

0.267***

0.069***

France

Albouy and Lequien (2009)

1937

All

0.11

N/A

France

Albouy and Lequien (2009)

1967

All

0.280***

N/A

France

Grenet (2013)

1967

Women 0.274***

−0.007

France

Grenet (2013)

1967

Men

0.263***

−0.004

Great Britain

Oreopoulos (2006a)

1947

All

0.436***

0.145**

Great Britain

Oreopoulos (2008)a

1947

All

0.408***

0.066

Ireland

Callan and Harmon (1999)

1972

Men

Not reportedb

0.10***

Italy

Brandolini and Cippolone
(2002)

1963

Women 0.124***

0.353***

0.207***

Country/region Study

Reform date

Gender 1st stage

Ln earnings
effect

Italy

Di Pietro and Delprato (2009) 1963

Men

1.69*

N/A

Italy

Flabbi (1999)

1963

Men

Not reported

0.053***

Italy

Flabbi (1999)

1963

Women Not reported

0.030***

N. Ireland

Oreopoulos (2006a)

1957

All

0.391***

0.187**

N. Ireland

Oreopoulos (2008)

1957

All

0.444***

0.18***

Netherlands

van Kippersluis et al. (2011)

1928

Men

0.669***

N/A

Netherlands

Levin and Plug (1999)

1947, 1950,
1975

Men

−0.168, −0.399, −1.927***

0.064**

Spain

Pons and Gonzalo (2002)c

1970

Men

0.82, 0.72*

−0.015

Sweden

Meghir and Palme (2005)

1962

All

0.298***

0.0142

Sweden

Hjalmarsson et al. (2015)

1962

Men

0.588*** (no municipality
FE)

N/A

Sweden

Hjalmarsson et al. (2015)

1962

Women 0.400*** (no municipality
FE)

N/A

Sweden

Hjalmarsson et al. (2015)

1962

Men

0.328***(municipality FE)

N/A

Sweden

Hjalmarsson et al. (2015)

1962

Women 0.199***(municipality FE)

N/A

UK

Harmon and Walker (1995)

1947, 1972/73

Men

0.54*, 0.11*

0.15**

UK

Oreopoulos (2006a)

1947/1957

All

0.397***

0.149***

UK

Oreopoulos (2008)

1947/1957

All

0.44**

0.105***

aOreopoulos (2008) is a corrigendum to Oreopoulos (2006a).
bCallan and Harmon (1999) state that the reform is not a valid instrument and they do not use it in their final IV
regressions.
cPons and Gonzalo (2002) state that the reform is not a valid instrument and they do not use it in their final IV
regressions.
***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1

Table A2. Left-right placement by country for individuals leaving full-time education at
21 years or older.
Country

N

Mean Std. Dev.

Austria

824

5.38

2.02

Belgium

3346 5.04

1.85

Denmark

4974 5.20

2.10

Country

N

Mean Std. Dev.

Greece

1808 5.06

2.08

France

1959 4.80

1.98

Ireland

1129 5.45

1.81

Italy

707

5.15

2.56

Netherlands

6566 4.80

1.96

Spain

1032 4.44

2.01

Sweden

3994 5.50

2.15

United Kingdom 2068 5.07

1.87

Note: This summarizes the sample generated by a bandwidth of ±10 years.

Table A3. 2SLS regression results, countries grouped by left-right placement.
Included countries

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

Left

Right

Center

Left and center Right and center

2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right
Education age

0.0800

0.390*

0.294

(0.153) (0.208) (0.194)

0.173

0.344**

(0.120)

(0.142)

0.332***

0.306***

1st stage. Outcome is education age.
Reform

0.345*** 0.296*** 0.317***

(0.120) (0.102) (0.0771) (0.0727)

(0.0657)

F-Stat on excluded instrument 8.27

8.42

16.93

20.86

21.68

(p-value)

0.0051

0.0050

0.0001

<0.0001

<0.0001

N

22,727

24,023

19,517

42,244

43,540

Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. The bandwidth is ±7 years.
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level,
reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects.
Left group = France, Netherlands, and Spain. Right group = Austria, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, and Sweden. Center
group=Belgium, Greece, and UK.
***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1

Table A4. Regression results leaving out 1 country.
Omitted
country

N

2nd stage effect of education age
on political ideology

Austria

61,864 0.206** (0.0961)

1st stage effect of reform on
education age

1st stage F-Stat on
excluded instrument

0.342*** (0.0630)

29.39

Omitted
country

N

Belgium

2nd stage effect of education age
on political ideology

1st stage effect of reform on
education age

1st stage F-Stat on
excluded instrument

60,887 0.251** (0.107)

0.327*** (0.0641)

26.10

Denmark

61,174 0.271** (0.108)

0.327*** (0.0606)

29.04

Greece

61,639 0.206* (0.108)

0.313*** (0.0624)

25.13

France

59,519 0.296** (0.125)

0.296*** (0.0598)

24.44

Ireland

61,464 0.251** (0.105)

0.346*** (0.0630)

30.21

Italy

62,735 0.226* (0.123)

0.284*** (0.0593)

22.92

Netherlands

54,355 0.211* (0.111)

0.321*** (0.0656)

23.93

Spain

62,200 0.306*** (0.112)

0.324*** (0.0602)

29.05

Sweden

60,075 0.239** (0.119)

0.293*** (0.0626)

21.94

United
Kingdom

56,758 0.282** (0.125)

0.307*** (0.0679)

20.45

Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. The bandwidth is ±7 years.
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level,
reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects.
***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1

Table A5. Falsification tests, reform dates moved backward and forward in time.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right
Education age

−0.383

−0.303

0.0947

0.726

−0.361

0.546

(0.571)

(4.04)

(0.435)

(0.958)

(0.453)

(0.843)

0.0726

0.0517

0.0788

0.0382

1st stage. Outcome is education age.
Reform

−0.0774 0.0343

(0.0693) (0.0663) (0.0534) (0.0518) (0.0504) (0.0440)
F-Stat on excluded instrument 1.25

0.268

1.85

0.996

2.45

1.00

N

36,129

39,641

59,678

71,224

77,728

101,114

False reform year

−4

4

−7

7

−10

10

Bandwidth

4

4

7

7

10

10

Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. The bandwidth is ±7 years.
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level,
reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects.

Table A6. Falsification tests, random reform years and random educational attainment.
(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

2nd stage. Outcome is left-right affiliation. 1 = far left, 5 = center, 10 = far right
Education age

−4.83

7.00

−12.34

−2.82

(11.62)

(38.20)

(130.44)

(7.10)

0.0292

−0.0123

−0.00634

−0.0231

(0.0694)

(0.0673)

(0.0669)

(0.0568)

F-Stat on excluded instrument

0.177

0.0332

0.0090

0.165

N

47, 709

67, 911

66,267

94,694

Reform year

Random

Random

Actual

Actual

Education

Actual

Actual

Random

Random

Bandwidth

7

10

7

10

1st stage. Outcome is education age
Reform

Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the birth year-reform level. The bandwidth is ±7 years.
All regressions include gender controls, a quadratic of age, linear cohort trends that can vary at the reform level,
reform fixed effects, and survey wave fixed effects.
***p < 0.01,
**p < 0.05,
*p < 0.1

Fig. A1. Density of the forcing variable. Note: Histogram shows the density of observations according to birth
cohort. Interval (k) = 0 corresponds to the pivot cohort.
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Some studies find no effects of education on health (Albouy and Lequien, 2009; Clark and Royer, 2013) or
inconclusive effects (Arendt, 2005). James (2015) finds effects for some health outcomes but not for others
and Brunello et al. (2013) find an effect for females but no effect for males.
2The Eurobarometer wave numbers are: 62.1, 62.2, 63.1, 63.2, 64.3, 64.4, 65.1, 66.2, 66.3, 67.1, 67.2, 68.1, 68.2,
69.1, 69.2, 70.1, 71.1, 72.4, 73.1, 74.2, 74.3, 75.1, 75.2, 76.1, and 77.2.
3I do not include the smaller number of waves that take place exclusively in summer months because this would
introduce more measurement error in the year of birth.
4Further details about the surveys are provided in Meyer (2015). Eurobarometer primary data files are publicly
available from GESIS (for example, European Commission, 2014).
5Including individuals in the sample who report an age higher than 35 when stopping education only slightly
changes point estimates across all specifications.
6Table 1 of Gathmann et al. (2015) list two early reforms that do not apply to this analysis. Denmark's 1903 reform
first affected those born in 1890 whereas the earliest birth year in Denmark in the present sample is
1914. Similarly, Belgium's 1919 reform first affected those born in 1910 whereas earliest birth year in
Belgium in the present sample is 1912.
7I exclude the regional level reforms from Finland because the within-country NUTS codes in some of the
Eurobarometer surveys do not map cleanly into the Brunello et al. (2009) regions; definitions of withincountry NUTS regions change over time. I also exclude regional level reforms from Germany because I
am not able to identify the region of birth. I discuss this further in Section 4.
8Consistent with Meyer (2015), I exclude individuals born in the pivot cohort from the sample because I cannot
accurately identify whether or not they were treated with the reform.
9I also include robustness checks using multiple other bandwidths.
10Exogenous controls such as age and gender can help reduce the sampling variability in the RD estimates (Lee
and Lemieux, 2010). Other potentially endogenous controls such as income that are simultaneously
determined with educational attainment should not be included in the regression design (Angrist and
Pischke, 2009).
11For the linear specification, γ3 = γ4 = 0.
12For the linear specification, λ = λ = 0.
3
4
13Brunello et al. (2009) also includes similar interactions.
14I thank an anonymous referee for making this point.
15However, as seen in appendix Fig. A1, I do not see any evidence of heaping at the pivot cohort when examining
the density of the forcing variable. Likewise, the test suggested by Cattaneo, Jansson, and Ma (2016a) finds
no evidence of a discontinuity in the density of the forcing variable at the pivot cohort. This test,
implemented on a bandwidth of 7 by the rddensity command (Cattaneo, Jansson, & Ma, 2016b) in Stata
reports test statistics (in parentheses) for three approaches: conventional (−0.217), undersmoothed
(0.0089), and robust bias-corrected (0.0747). Barreca, Lindo, and Waddell (2016) more deeply explore this
issue of bias from heaping in the running variable.
1

I utilize the rdrobust package in Stata for all nonparametric local linear regressions (Calonico, Cattaneo, & Titiunik,
2014b).
17Brunello et al. (2013) use a similar clustering strategy.
18I utilize Roodman's (2011) cmp program within Stata 14.1 to estimate the parameters of this system of
equations.
19As emphasized by Esping-Anderson (1999), “readers should be warned that ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ are used
here in their classical, European usage. Liberal therefore does not imply leftist, but rather a laissez-faire,
neo-liberal view; conservative does not refer to ‘whatever is not liberal’, be it the Christian right or the
Republican party, but to the European usage of the term.”
20Another difference is that Meghir and Palme (2005) impute years of education from categorical education levels.
21Results for these robustness checks from other bandwidths are available upon request.
22Using the analogous specifications to columns 1 and 3 of Table 5, the 2nd stage coefficient on education is
0.0198 with a standard error of 0.0206 for a bandwidth of 10 (n = 109,238) and 0.0180 with a standard
error of 0.0178 for a bandwidth of 7 (n = 76,326).
23Using the analogous specifications to columns 1 and 3 of Table 5, the 2nd stage coefficient on education is
0.0016 with a standard error of 0.023 for a bandwidth of 10 (n = 94,694) and 0.013 with a standard error
of 0.022 for a bandwidth of 7 (n = 66,267).
24Grenet (2013) conducts similar falsification tests in moving the reforms forward or backward several years.
25This follows the fake reform falsification test from Borgonovi et al. (2010). I exclude Netherlands from this
falsification test because the randomly selected years would cause the falsified reforms to overlap.
26I take the true observations on educational attainment for the entire sample and randomly assign each true
observation to a different individual.
27One exception is the bias-corrected point estimate in column 2 is substantially larger than the others.
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